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Competition Law Reform in Turkey: Actors,
Networks, Translations
ZIYA UMUT TUREM*
ABSTRACT
This article explains the shift from an initially European-oriented
and politically motivated competition law, toward a U.S. style and
aspiringly apolitical competition regime in Turkey. Translation is used
as an analytic to capture the complex processes of such a shift. The
article argues that this shift can be explained first by the broad turn
toward the U.S. as a source of state expertise and knowledge production
in the context of the Cold War. This broad historical dynamic could only
be activated, however, by the emergence of a critical mass of policy
entrepreneurs and state officials shifting the momentum of policy
making away from national developmentalism toward neoliberalism.
Such a critical juncture, formed essentially by a generational shift, has
been decisive in changing the character of competition law regime in
Turkey. A new generation of bureaucrats ended up translating
competition in a way that furthers their political goals. This process has
contributed to the strengthening of a certain type of competition law
regime or network globally.
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 1994, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed
the Law on the Protection of Competition (No. 4054) at the initiation of
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the then governing two-party coalition government.' The passage of the
law, which has effectively created a body of competition and antitrust
laws, came after two similar but failed attempts during the 1980s.
Those earlier attempts were left to die in the back halls of the Turkish
Congress without even being introduced to the General Assembly for a
vote. The passage of the law marked the beginning of a significant
episode in Turkish economic management: that of building independent
expert institutions or agencies to control and regulate the neoliberal
economic opening.
Two points immediately stood out: On the one hand, the law was
accompanied by, and legitimized with, an explicitly "political" language;
on the other, the law essentially drew its inspiration from Europe. As
for the former, two key goals were expressed openly by the Minister of
Industry and Commerce, who prepared and pushed for the passage of
the law: First, small and medium sized enterprises would be among the
key beneficiaries of this particular body of law. Second, because this law
was part of an "economic democratization" package, one of its main
objectives was to protect consumers. These two constituencies, small
and medium-sized enterprises and consumers, former more tangible
than the latter, would be the target population for the legal reform, and
they are considered to be the likely beneficiaries of the law. As for the
inspiration for the law: Europe, and, in particular, Germany, appeared
to be the place from which Turkish bureaucrats drew inspiration when
assessing what code to adopt.
From the moment the law was set in motion by the establishment of
the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) in 1997, things looked rather
different. Analyzing the publications of the agency reveals that the
political emphasis that was dominant in the legislators' discourse has
been sharply silenced as the TCA started practicing its craft. Not only
did the two constituencies mentioned above disappear from the field of
competition law practice, but there has also been a significant insistence
that competition law has to be apolitical. Similarly, despite the
continuing importance of European Union case law for Turkish
competition law, the intellectual inspiration has shifted toward the
United States.
How can this relatively sudden shift be explained? This article is an
answer to this very question first and foremost. By outlining a brief (and
necessarily broad-brush) history of Turkish competition law through
this question, I also explore the question of legal reform in the period of
global neoliberalization. I argue that the seemingly unique Turkish case
1. Competition Authority, REKABET.GOV, http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/default.aspx?nsw
=e2zD+crWr/0=-H7deC+LxBI8- (last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (Turk.) (providing the online
text of the competition law in Turkish and brief information on its legislative history).
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can be used as a crystallized moment through which the broader politics
of the recent legal proliferation under globalization can be viewed and
analyzed.
It is obvious that the competition code in Turkey, as well as in the
other countries adopting such codes in the post-1980 years, has been
produced in dialogue with the external world. The U.S. model and
various European Union country laws have been influential in the
shaping of the Turkish code, just as they have been influential in the
shaping of competition regimes elsewhere. 2 This process, however, is
understood best not as diffusion, as it is commonly framed, or as a direct
import or as a legal transplant. All these framings assume a stable,
well-defined object that can move between different jurisdictions-in
this case a body of competition laws. What in fact happens, I want to
point out, is much more complicated, intricate, and political than the
diffusion model allows for. The shift I point to in terms of the content of
competition laws in Turkey will serve as an instance to view such
complex politics at work.
"Translation" offers a solid yet sufficiently flexible frame to view
this complexity. It offers a uniquely powerful analytic and heuristic tool
to make sense of the Turkish case, as well as the broader politics of
global legal reform in neoliberalism. I use the concept in three senses in
this article. First, employing a broad and general meaning of the term, I
start with the assumption that translation has always been a useful
concept to study legal exchanges between different jurisdictions or legal
fields. While literal legal translations have constituted the core of legal
formations since at least the mid-nineteenth centuryA it is also possible
to speak of "legal borrowing as translation" in a broader sense. Since all
legal borrowing or importing implies some form of reproduction and
reformation of an original, analyzing such reproduction processes as
translation, or simply such translation processes, renders visible the
power dynamics, deeper structural meanings, as well as discursive
regularities that constitute the context in which such translations take
place.4
2. See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAWS, MARKETS AND GLOBALIZATION
121-22 (2010).
3. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000,
in THE NEW LAW AND EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 19 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); see also Iza Hussin, Misreading and Mobility in
Constitutional Texts: A Nineteenth Century Case, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 145, 150
(2014).
4. See James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Making of
Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1845-51 (1996) (explaining that
translation, understood as incorporation of the whole or part of a foreign body of law, has
been crucial in the history of the production of the Western legal canon; the translation, or
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In a second vein, competition laws offer a robust site in which a
translation framework can be utilized beyond its relatively more
traditional usages. By their nature, competition laws contain more
economic analyses than other branches or subfields of law. "The
increasing influence of economic discourse [on law] was particularly felt
in the area of competition law," writes loannis Lianos.5 This influence
has increased even more in the global neoliberal period. This means
that not only are there translations between countries or jurisdictions,
which look to one another for competition laws, but also within the law,
there must constantly be translations between two disciplines and
discursive universes: law and economics.6 As importantly, perhaps, the
neoclassical revival of economics in the neoliberal period has depended
all too heavily on mathematics in theorizing, formulizing, and
ultimately explaining its object of study. "The alliance of mathematical
economics and neoclassical price theory in the 1950s with the
development of a mathematical proof of the general equilibrium theory
still dominates the field of welfare economics."7 This. means that a
constant flow of translations is needed both between jurisdictions and
disciplinary lines when it comes to competition laws.8
In yet a third meaning, I will follow the concept of translation as
mobilized within the "actor-network" theory.9 This will constitute the
essential theoretical background to this article. According to this
framework, which will be explored below, particular scientific
incorporation of Roman law, or natural law in the process of modernization of legality is a
case in point).
5. Ioannis Lianos, "Lost in Translation'? Towards a Theory of Economic Transplants
4 (2009) (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper 08/09), available at www.
JeanMonnetProgram.org.
6. See James Boyd White, Establishing Relations Between Law and Other Forms of
Thought and Language 12-13 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 113, 2008) (showing "relations between law and other forms of
thought and language" have been studied before). As I examine below, however, according
to White, what happens between law and economics is not "translation" per se, but an
attempt by economics at erasure of the law. See id. at 14.
7. Lianos supra note 5, at 8.
8. It is possible to push this link further and further historicize these disciplinary
translations. Economics, since the 19th century onwards, has implicitly and explicitly
based itself on "natural sciences," notably physics, and later in the 20th century there has
been a fair amount of translations and crossovers between "cyborg science" and economics.
See generally PHILIP MIROWSKI, MACHINE DREAMS: EcoNOMIcS BECOMES A CYBORG
SCIENCE (2002) (explaining the crossovers between "cyborg science" and economics);
PHILIP MIROWSKI, MORE HEAT THAN LIGHT: EcoNOMIcS AS SOCIAL PHYSICS, PHYSICS AS
NATURE'S ECONOMICS (1989) (explaining the former physics connection). Nevertheless, I
will not pursue these points in this article.
9. See generally BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY (2005) (providing a general outline of this body of work).
162
COMPETITION LAW REFORM IN TURKEY
approaches or paradigms are actor-networks. They do not become
dominant or hegemonic due to their inherent explanatory power or
truth capacity, but, rather, they become powerful the more they
convince as many allies or actors as possible. Translation, in this
context, is key in the process of adding allies to a network. Each
individual, or 'group of individuals, has to translate the core of the
network-the paradigm-to its own interests to become part of a
network. This act of translation, while, on the one hand, extends and, by
definition, strengthens the network, also alters and modifies the
network itself.
With these usages in mind, I show in the following pages that
competition laws and their proliferation in Turkey-and elsewhere-
should be seen and analyzed as a process of translation, rather than
diffusion or transplantation. More substantively, I show that the
translation of competition law and economics to Turkey has started as a
process that took its inspiration and sources from Europe-Germany in
particular. It was a political project with explicit political goals. It is
possible, after this initial start, to trace a shift toward a more U.S.-style
of antitrust regulation. The explicitly political edge of Turkish
competition law is silenced for a more economic expertise-oriented view
of competition law. What started out as a more traditional project to
mobilize law for political ends ended up being drawn to the orbit of a
new style of expert politics or politics of expertise. In the process of this
shift, we see a parallel shift away from Europe toward the United
States. Europe, which had long been the source and inspiration of law
reform for Turkey, and for semi-peripheral countries of the global
political economy, has been losing its status to the United States.
My argument as to why this shift has taken place originates from
within the actor-network theory's approaches, accompanied with a
slight corrective from a different theoretical tradition. The shift, first
and foremost, can be explained to be a result of a changing generation of
bureaucrats and its understanding of state expertise. The political
orientations of different actors, and the changing stakes of competition
expertise, pave the way for the emergence of a new body of translators.
This changes the course of competition policy from its initial
beginning-a politically oriented and more European competition law
regime-toward a more U.S.-style of antitrust in which economics
expertise is considered key. This shift can also be seen as the mutation
or adaptation of the network of competition law and economics in
Turkey. In other words, by adding more allies by way of multiple
translations, new actors are brought into the field of competition, and
this eventually renders the competition actor-network more solid, in
Turkey as well as globally. So while the shift appears as a break, it also
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offers continuity in terms of bringing in a diverse set of new allies
behind the competition network.
The point where the actor-network theory fails to satisfactorily shed
light on this shift concerns the broader socio-historical framework in
which this shift and Turkey's overall experience with competition laws
are situated. While the shift from a traditional politics-oriented
competition law to a new politics of expertise may appear like a quick
one, it has been in the making for quite a while. I briefly employ the
insights of another major sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, by way of his
followers, particularly Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, 0 to point to
some of the weaknesses in the actor-network theory and its possible
uses in explaining the global proliferation of neoliberal forms of state
expertise. I argue using the Turkish case that any possible utilization of
actor-network theory is very much crippled by its relative neglect of
structural factors and broader socio-historical trajectories. I thus
introduce very briefly the Bourdieusian framework introduced by
Dezalay and Garth to complement the theoretical frame that is
constructed depending on actor-network theory. More substantively, I
argue that the shifting practice of competition law in a short span of
time should be analyzed as part of the broader replacement of Europe
by the United States as the source of knowledge and state expertise in
the Post-World War II period. Combined with the maturing United
States influence that began to bear its fruits in the Turkish state during
the 1980s, the generation of bureaucrats who came of age during the
strong military rule in the post-1980 period determined the course of the
competition policy in the years to come.
In the next section, I elaborate briefly on the theme of translation
and set this background as the theoretical lens to analyze the Turkish
case. In the second section, I focus on the trajectories of competition law
in Turkey and demonstrate the shift in competition policies. In the third
section, I talk about why such a shift takes place in light of the
theoretical work outlined in the second section. Last, I conclude.
10. See generally YVEs DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN
STATES (2002) (examining both the production of northern exports such as neoliberal
economics and international human rights law and the way they are received south of the
United States). For an elaboration on the theoretical framework of this book, and its
employment of the Bourdieusian sociology, see generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH,
DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996).
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I. TRANSLATING IDEAS, LAWS, AND INSTITUTIONS
At the heart of this article lies the deceptively simple question: "how
to study the proliferation of similar laws and institutions in different
parts of the world under neoliberalism?" Certainly, it is possible to
extend this question beyond neoliberalism and go for an even more
encompassing theory of legal and economic "transplants." However, I
will limit myself to the question of neoliberalism and offer a historically
contextualized narrative rather than an account that depends on a
systematic theorization of legal circulation.
Competition laws and their proliferation in the post-1980 period
offer a robust setting through which such legal and economic circulation
can be analyzed. The dominant paradigm to explain such proliferation
appears to be the "diffusion" model. Accordingly, laws and institutions
that appear to provide beneficial effects diffuse to other parts of the
world due to their inherent correctness, appropriateness, or efficacy. If
an institution works well in a context, this is considered to be the
grounds for the importing of that institution to countries lacking it.
There is an echo of functionalism evident in this way of thinking that
renders it problematic from a social science point of view. There, too, is
an equally problematic bracketing of a variety of major social and
political dynamics that condition the work and efficacy of institutions in
different social and political settings.
Still, the problem with the diffusionist accounts is not that they do
not take into account potential failures or incompatibility of certain
institutional forms with the social settings they are introduced into.
Some are free from these errors. The essential problem is that the
diffusion paradigm fails to describe and explain convincingly the process
of institutionalization of competition, as well as broader neoliberal
regulatory reforms, in different national or regional contexts by
imagining or working with the assumption of stable objects like
institutions or bodies of law that travel across boundaries. As Neil
Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore put it in reference to another
context:
[The] proliferation [of regulatory reorganizations] under
post-1970s capitalism cannot be understood through
simple 'diffusion' models. For, rather than entailing the
construction of some fully formed, coherently
functioning, 'regime-like' state of neoliberalism that has
progressively expanded to encompass global regulatory
space, the process of neoliberalization has been
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articulated unevenly across places, territories and
scales."
The so-called diffusion process, therefore, is very complicated. In
fact, the object of analysis (i.e., the object that diffuses) is produced
again and again in its very movement and circulation. 12 So how can we
make sense of and analyze this process of proliferation? Translation
offers a powerful heuristic and analytical tool to explore the diverse
processes of institutional (re)formation and (re)production under
neoliberalism, including, but not limited to, the institutionalization of
competition law regimes in various country settings.
At the broadest level, it can be argued that, with globalization,
translation explodes both as a practice to connect diverse locales,
peoples, and cultures, as well as an analytic to view and analyze such
processes of communication and translation. In the current phase of
globalization, communities, countries, and peoples in different parts of
the world are certainly much better connected than in the previous
decades, leading the way for more contacts and institutional and legal
cross-fertilizations. 13 This increasing connectivity, however, does not
mean increasing similarity or a simple move toward homogeneity. On
the contrary, such connectivity means (an) ever-increasing (need for)
translations. Rather than thinking of the neoliberalization process as
the diffusion of some originals from certain locales to others, we need to
think more in terms of constant circulations-of models, prospects, and
legalities-and their translation to different contexts. As Michael
Cronin puts it, it is useful to think of "globalization as translation," or a
series of translations. Cronin continues:
[T]he geographical spread of globalization and the extent
of the penetration of the neo-liberal version-prominent
in localization writing-can be overstated. . . . This is to
suggest that there is no single model of globalization
which is adopted willy-nilly by different nation-states
but that each country or community translates elements
of the global . . . economy into local circumstances. The
result is the nationally and regionally differentiated
11. Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck & Nik Theodore, After Neoliberalization?, 7 GLoBAUZATIONS
327, 331 (2010) (emphasis in original).
12. See, e.g., Hussin, supra note 3, at 156 (discussing legal circulations and accompanying
legal transformations).
13. For a discussion of cross-fertilization in the transnational legal contexts, see
generally Antje Wiener & Philip Liste, Lost Without Translation? Cross-Referencing and a
New Global Community of Courts, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2014).
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experiences of globalization across the planet.
Translation is not simply a by-product of globalization
but is a constituent, integral part of how the
phenomenon both operates and makes sense of itself.14
Connecting back to the question of global legal reform, it can be
argued that the mode of legal reform becomes translation, which is
carried out from a variety of sources, not just from one or two.
Translation now is the mode or medium; it is the message so to speak.
This wealth of translations does not mean that there are no hierarchies
in the global political economy. There certainly are. However, in
analytically examining legal reform, theorists should not overlook the
complexity of the current situation by recourse to relatively simple
frames that use global hierarchies in explaining the flow of legalities
around the globe.15 At the very least, it is of key importance to recognize
that "neoliberalism was not simply disseminated from West to East, but
was made possible and constructed through the dialogue and exchanges
that took place within [a] transnational network."16 Similarly, a focus on
translation, the process that dominates any legal reform initiative
today, is a requirement to understand the subject matter.
This insightful, yet broad, view of translation as an analytic can be
further narrowed down and specified as it applies to the question of
competition law and economics. The actor-network theory, initiated by
French sociologists Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, in particular,
offers significant insights. By using the concept in combination with the
analytical tool of networks, Latour makes explicit use of the concept of
translation to advance a new theory of society as an assemblage.' 7 His
account is particularly helpful to understand the simultaneous
increases in global translations of competition law and the increasing
dominance of the "science" of economics within competition law as a
discipline.
14. MICHAEL CRONIN, TRANSLATION AND GLOBALIZATION 34 (2010).
15. For a similar point, see Andrea Ballestero, What's in a Percentage? Calculation as
the Poetic Translation of Human Rights, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 29 (2014)
(suggesting that "percentages determine better targets because they translate succinct
definitions of human rights into complex webs of signification, responsibility, and
economic redistribution outside of human rights courts and institutions," and
consequently, "that percentages can perform that translation work because the better
target is not the target that is concrete, narrow, and precise").
16. Johanna Bockman & Gil Eyal, Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic
Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism, 108 AM. J. Soc. 310, 311 (2002).
17. See generally LATOUR, supra note 9, at 1 (providing a brief overview of the Actor-
Network theory).
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One of Latour's main lines of inquiry is concerned with studying
science and the scientific language from a sociological perspective. In an
effort to go beyond the authoritative-and thus intimidating-language
of science, Latour analyzes how science in particular-and expertise
centered discourses (such as law) in general-gain the authority they
have. He does so by trying hard to avoid the trap of accepting the
authority claims as valid at face value.18 What he suggests instead is
that scientific artifacts are indeed "actor-networks"; "that is, . . .
network[s] composed of a set of ties and alliances between human and
non human agents."19 In trying to understand the emergence,
production, or persistence of an institutional form, one needs to "focus
on the actual work of constructing a network and of establishing ties
between statements, instrumentation, effects demonstrated in the lab,
financial resources, the opinion and support of colleagues, and other
such components." 20
In the case of competition laws, then, rather than trying to explain
the extent and reach of competition laws with reference to their
diffusion (due to their scientificity, or simply their power to better
manage "the market"), one needs to look at the actors and agents who
stand to gain from being part of the network of competition law people.
To the extent that the "network" can recruit more actors, or to the
extent, in other words, that the network can bring in more allies by
plastically expanding itself, it will become more solid and end up
generating and sustaining institutions.
Translation is the key concept in the actor-network theory.
Accordingly, translation refers to
the methods by which an actor enrols [sic] others . . . i.e.
the way in which the various actors engaged in
production/innovation processes (actors whose primary
interests are not necessarily the same) interpret their
own objectives into each other's language so as to ensure
everyone's proper participation (or the dismissal of some
actors if necessary) and the continuation of the project
until fulfillment.21
18. See BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: How To FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND
ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 1 (1987) (discussing these points and the general Latourian
framework).
19. Bockman & Eyal, supra note 16, at 314.
20. Id.
21. Helene Buzelin, Unexpected Allies: How Latour's Network Theory Could
Complement Bourdieusian Analyses in Translation Studies, 11 THE TRANSIATOR 193, 196-
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Attention has to be paid not just to the human agents, but also the
wealth of documentation, institutionalization, as well as the production
of discourse within the network. All these different "extensions" have
the effect of extending the reach of the network, making it more solid.
Lastly,
[I]f a certain institutional form is reproduced and
disseminated, this is in direct proportion to the amount
of resources mobilized through network ties, to the
strength of the ties forged, and to the capacity of
interested actors to close them in a 'black box'; that is, to
hide the work needed to connect together the different
elements of the actor-network. 22
In Latour's own words, when "a large number of elements is made to
act as one . . . when all the gathered resources are made to act as one
unbreakable whole," the blackboxing operation is complete, and
institutions get to be successfully reproduced, seeming as if it all
happens naturally, due to the inherent rationality of the institution or
its superiority over others.23
The creation of competition laws in Turkey can be seen as an
instance of finding and recruiting new allies in this country for the
"expert governance" of the economy and the ascent of neoclassical
economic discourse. Through Latour's framework, though, it is essential
to view the process of recruiting allies for and the strengthening of the
network-in this case the network of competition law and economics. A
researcher needs to be attentive to how and in what ways actors in a
given national setting end up translating the network and its existence
as a way to appropriate such institutionality. Conversely, of course, the
power of a particular brand of competition law that has come to be
globalized is connected to the actors it can bring in to participate in its
own network. As we will see below, the shift in Turkey from a European
type of a competition law toward a U.S.-style antitrust regime can be
seen from this angle. The U.S.-style neoliberalism ended up bringing in
more allies to its ranks, being produced more solidly than the European
social market economy approach.
In other words, in the case of this article, competition laws and
agencies are not stable models that get to be transferred from the
neoliberal heartlands to the semi-peripheries; rather, they are produced
97 (2005) (internal quotations removed) (quoting MICHEL CALLON, JOHN LAW & ARIE RIP,
MAPPING THE DYNAMICs OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY xvii (1986)).
22. Bockman & Eyal, supra note 16, at 314.
23. BRUNO LATOUR, supra note 18, at 131-32.
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as a model in that very act of transmission and as an effect of the
network of people, authority claims, and nonhuman agents that coalesce
around these laws. The rise of such neoliberal legal forms cannot,
therefore, be detached from their social and political context, as they are
implicated in the power relations that cross-cut and, in that very sense,
connect the importing and exporting countries. In this sense,
competition laws can be theorized as an actor-network. The success of
this very network comes in part from adding as many allies as possible
to its ranks and in part from its power to make invisible the political
work that keeps it alive and well, while ascribing the success of
competition laws by referring to these laws' implicit and inherent
efficacy in governing. 24
Following the above thread, the broad shift toward neoliberal
economics and competition laws as part of this shift can be explained by
utilizing the actor-network framework. Particularly, the rise of
economics discipline as a route to power and the way it came to contest
law as a basis for state expertise is a case in point.25 Another similar
point concerns the turf wars between neoliberal economics and
Keynesian economics in terms of economic management. The struggles
between these camps can be analyzed by using a Latourian framework.
After all, if economics is considered to be an authoritative language-an
aspiring scientific discourse-an analysis of how one specific branch of
economics (neoliberal or neoinstitutional) has come to win over another
(old) branch (Keynesianism) offers perfect grounds for studying how
certain paradigms are taken over by others. With the tools of actor-
network theory, researchers can study closely how different actors came
to view the new networks (i.e., neoliberal economics) as more beneficial
for their interests and how, in the process, they opened up the black box
of developmentalism and Keynesian economics, as well as the law.26
24. It has to be noted, at this point, that the actor-network theory has to be utilized
with care when applied to concrete settings, particularly when one wants to talk about the
global proliferation of a body of laws. After all, the actor network-theory, methodologically
speaking, focuses on the "micro" processes, and does so "from the inside," i.e. the theory
aims to "observe how actors make their decisions and interact while still unsure of the
outcome[.]" As a consequence, "explanations are no longer found in contextual 'macro-
level' or structural determinants, but in the network itself, or, more precisely, in its length
and structure." Buzelin, supra note 21, at 197.
25. In this sense, it is noteworthy to point out, once again, James Boyd White's point
that economics appears too aggressively. See, e.g., Boyd White, supra note 6, at 14. It is
possible to see this penetration as an example of a profession(al network) expanding its
domain, and exposing law's black box, and in particular, challenging its (law's) claims to
state expertise. See generally MARC ALLEN EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF
EcoNOMIcs: INSTITUTIONs, EXPERTISE AND POLICY CHANGE (1991) (providing an insightful
take on this professional struggle in the context of the American antitrust field).
26. See generally YUVAL P. YONAY, STRUGGLE OVER THE SOUL OF ECONOMICS (1998),
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While Latour's perspective does carry important insights as to how
we can consider competition law regimes as a network, it can be further
enriched and complemented by accounts that analyze the broader power
dynamics and structural locations. A focus on the macro level
phenomena that also emphasize contextual or socio-historical power
dynamics would provide a necessary corrective to the actor-network
framework, which tends to focus too much on the inside of a network
with the price of neglecting some essential power dynamics.
Read this way, Latour's account can be enriched with analyses of
neoliberal globalization that are inspired by the work of a "rival" French
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.27 In using Bourdieu's framework, socio-legal
scholars Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth show that the struggles to
obtain and reach state power, or simply power, in the countries of the
Global South and global north came to be entangled intricately in the
process of globalization and neoliberalization. Accordingly, elites and
experts who are aspiring to amass state/political power end up forging
connections with similar groups in other country contexts, while
mobilizing such connections as routes to power in their respective power
fields. This way, not only do such groups create a power base for
themselves, but also through the multiplication of such instances of
cross-border relations globalization/the global space is produced as a
reality, despite its unevenness. The strength of Dezalay and Garth's
account lies in its historicity: they show a general pattern of how, in the
second half of the twentieth century with the decline of Europe and the
rise of the United States and the Cold War rivalry, the European
influence on the states of the Global South has decreased. Earlier
European influence was based essentially on the exporting of law and
legal language as instruments of statehood, as well as markers of
political power, from Europe to semi-peripheries of the world economy.
The elites in the global semi-peripheral contexts, such as Mexico, Brazil,
for an excellent illustration of the use of a Latourian framework to explain the struggle
between neoclassical and institutional economics between the two world wars.
27. These two sociologists are self-proclaimed rivals. Their rivalry originates from the
fact that their epistemologies are fundamentally different, if not fully opposed. Bourdieu
bases his theoretical work on a line of classical sociologists and anthropologists,
emphasizes the notion of "practice," and, in the last instance, he has an "enlightenment"
streak in his work (particularly in his work on science). Latour, on the other hand, aims
and claims to radically alter the studying and analysis of "the social" by reassembling it
without subscribing to any philosophical milestones, such as enlightenment, and by taking
into account non human "agents" (such as documents, non human animals, etc.) in the
making of the present. However "unlikely," the two names can be seen, and are
considered, as complementary to one another on the issue of translation. For an article on
this point of fusion, particularly as it relates to the sociological analysis of literary
translations, see generally Buzelin, supra note 21. For a biting critique of Latour's work
by Bourdieu, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, SCIENCE OF SCIENCE AND REFLEXIVITY 29-31 (2004).
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or Argentina, used European legal education as a way to attain state
power and bolster their already established power in the,society. In the
course of the Cold War, and particularly after the rise of the law and
economics movement in the United States, the "technopols," products of
U.S. universities, began to take over "the gentlemen lawyers" as the
able statesmen of the global south. All the while, economics has begun
to rival, if not replace, law as the essential language and tool of
statehood. 28
In this context, it can be argued that economics as a discipline and
science has become more solid as more alliances are formed between
economics-oriented civil servants/bureaucrats, university economics
departments, as well as private (market) agents in different global
locations, both north and south. A case in point here is the earlier set of
networks crafted between the University of Chicago's Department of
Economics and economics departments outside of the United States,
such as Catholic University of Chile or Mexico's Autonomous
Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM). 29 Similar networks, as we will
see in the next section, have been crafted between the United States
and Turkey in the second half of the twentieth century. Similarly,
Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal note that neoliberal connections have
been in the making for quite sometime between U.S. economists and
East European economists. 30 In the Post-World War II context, in
general, the United States has shifted from being a recipient of laws and
institutional forms to being an exporter of such models.31 Through this
process of shifting locales, "economics" became more important as the
role of the law declined.
More to the point, the power of neoclassical and neoliberal
economics within the United States has also benefited from the
connections it forged with key semi-peripheral countries such as Mexico,
Chile, or Turkey. The Chicago School of Economics, for instance, which
had been relatively marginal in the 1960s, used networking with semi-
peripheral country universities as a strategy to build up its strength
28. For the claims in this paragraph and their further elaboration, see generally
DEZAILAY & GARTH, supra note 10 (exploring the role of exported American expertise and
ideals in the transformation of South American state forms and economies since World
War II).
29. See SARAH BABB, MANAGING MEXICO: EcONOMIcS FROM NATIONALISM TO
NEOLIBERALISM 126-36 (2001).
30. Bockman & Eyal, supra note 16, at 311.
31. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 24 ("The account that follows ... portrays the United
States up to the 1930s as a context of legal reception, that is, as part of the periphery or
semi periphery. Legal development was heavily determined by what was happening in
Germany and later France, but the original Unitedstatesean synthesis had no influence on
those countries.").
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within the United States. This was made possible, of course, by the deep
ideological work they carried out in these locales, particularly against
the perceived communist threat. This ideological work took, on the one
hand, the form of support for military juntas and definition of the
contours of an economic policy for otherwise economically illiterate
juntas.32 On the other hand, the "methodological individualism" that is
strongly present in the work of the Chicago School made possible an
arguably deeper ideological shift toward "liberal democracy" as an
antidote to communism. 33 Even more to the point, the specific brand of
antitrust that came to dominate the United States legal sphere in the
1970s and 1980s-the Chicago School (as opposed to "the process
school")-obtained part of its power from the connections it forged and
exports it made to other countries.34
While not explicitly framing the issue as one of translation, this
Bourdieusian account points to the slippery politics of holding on to
state power in a globalizing context and shows what kind of connections
and networks tend to be successful in the so-called neoliberal era. While
Dezalay and Garth's study does not try to tell the micro-level stories of
the building up of networks, it shows, in a broad brush, that the
neoliberal economists from the United States and their allies in the
Global South have been successful in opening the black box of
Keynesianism and creating a solid black box for neoliberal economics.
Consequently, the study shows the latter become intellectually and
materially superior to the former over the course of time. This
superiority, of course, is produced through the extension of the actor
network that is neoliberal economics. A full discussion of such
production is beyond the scope of this essay, but in the next section, the
focus on Turkey highlights how this shift took place there.
II. THE BEGINNINGS AND EVOLUTION OF COMPETITION LAW
(PRACTICE) IN TURKEY
The Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition was passed on
December 7, 1994, as already mentioned in the introduction. A brief
32. See generally JUAN GABRIEL VALDAS, PINOCHET'S ECONOMISTS: THE CHICAGO
SCHOOL IN CHILE (1995) (providing an account of the implantation, growth, and eventual
supremacy of Chicago-style, technocratic economic sciences in Chile from the mid 1950s).
33. See generally S. M. AMADAE, RATIONALIZING CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY: THE COLD
WAR ORIGINS OF RATIONAL CHOICE LIBERALISM (2003) (providing an account of how
rational choice theory rose from obscurity to become the intellectual bulwark of capitalist
democracy).
34. See generally EISNER, supra note 25 (providing an insightful take on the
encroachment of economics in the context of the American antitrust field).
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glance at the process of the making of the law is in order, however, to
view the translation in a longer time frame. The law was passed by a
coalition government. After eight years of a right-wing, single-party
government from 1983 to 1991, the Turkish general elections led to the
formation of a coalition government. In 1991, a center-right and social
democratic coalition replaced the center-right and economically liberal
Motherland Party (MP), which had been in power from 1983 to 1991.
The senior partner in the coalition was the right-of-center True Path
Party (TPP), and the junior partner was the left-of-center Social
Democratic People's Party (SDPP). The Ministry of Industry and
Commerce, which drafted the competition law, was controlled by the
SDPP. The senior partner was hesitant to follow the lead of the junior
partner in setting up a competition law regime primarily because it had
closer ties with the big business community.35 The junior partner
overcame this initial hesitation, or resistance, by pointing out that
competition law was a necessary step to take toward the fulfillment of
Turkey's obligations for the upcoming Customs Union with European
Union.36
Despite this instrumental argument, the law meant more-indeed
much more-to the coalition partner drafting it. According to Hurgit
Giine§, the Chief Economic Advisor to the SDPP who oversaw the
drafting of the law, it would be a mistake to ascribe too much weight to
the Customs Union in the passage of the law. 37 Before the law was
passed, and in its immediate aftermath, the rationale for the passage of
the law was explained in starkly political terms. According to Tahir
K6se, the Minister of Trade and Industry at the time, the initial and
major motivation of the Ministry and of himself in initiating a
commission to prepare the Competition Law was "economic
democratization." K6se argues, back in 1994 three weeks after the law
was passed, that his party considered "economic democratization as a
package," and competition law, in addition to the law on the protection
of consumers, was one of the most important pieces of legislation in that
35. For an overview of the Turkish politics and history of elections between 1980 and
2002, see ERIC JAN ZURCHER, TURKEY: A MODERN HISTORY 278-306 (3d ed. 2004).
36. Interview with Kemal Erol, Former Competition Board member and independent
lawyer, in Istanbul, Turk. (June 28, 2006) (stating that the SDPP used the Customs Union
as a tool to convince the senior partner TPP to pass the law. Customs Union treaty was a
free trade agreement that would include Turkey in a common customs regime with the
European Union. The treaty was the natural result of an earlier agreement between
Turkey and the European Union, the Ankara Agreement, signed back in 1959.).
37. See Hurgit Giine, Yrk Rekabet Yasasnu Hazzrlama Guduleri ve Uygulamasma 1kin
Oneri7erlThe Motives for Drafting the Turkish Competition Law and Recommendations for its
Practice], PER$EMBE KONFERANsLARI [THURSDAY CONFERENCES] 3, 5-6 (2000) (Turk.).
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package.38 Competition law would therefore serve the interests of "the
consumer, a rather abstract, yet meaningful construct in the Turkey of
the post-1980 period, which was shifting from a planned national
economy to a liberalized consumer society."3
The consumer of the SDPP was a political construct, however. Not
only did it exist within a discourse of (economic) democratization, but it
also constituted a continuity with the earlier emphases of the SDPP on
the middle class and the ways in which the uncontrolled neoliberal
opening of the 1980s hurt a bulk of Turkey's population. Accordingly,
the middle class had been so hurt by the (allegedly) corrupt and vulgar
economic policies of the previous single-party government of the MP
that, for the SDPP, the consumer figure stood for the people at large.
Thus, the goal of passing a competition law was to make sure that the
people, not big corporations, would benefit from the policies of neoliberal
opening in Turkey.40 So it appears that the emphasis on the consumer
was the continuation of the election platform of the SDPP, which mainly
ran on the basis that the previous MP government crushed the middle
class. 41 The goal, in other words, was to protect the people-consumers
against a corrupt economic system that benefited the government as
well as big corporations. The consumer figure was an abstraction but
not in the same degree as in economic textbooks.
Perhaps more explicitly and concretely political about the
competition laws in their initial stages are the open references to small
and medium sized enterprises. On December 16, 1992, two years before
the passage of the law and approximately one year after the coalition
government-who later passed the law-had been formed, a symposium
entitled "The Protection of Competition in Turkey and Small and
38. See Tahir K6se, Speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 19th Congress,
4th Legislative Year, 63rd Session, pp. 185-86 (Dec. 28, 1994). See also TuketiciyiKoruma
Paketi[Consumer Protection Package], MILLIYET (Istanbul), Dec. 14, 1992, at 11.
39. See KORKUT BORATAV, TURKiYE IKTISAT TARiHi: 1908-2002 [TURKIsH EcoNoMic
HiSTORY 1908-2002] 145-169 (9th ed. 2002) (Turk.).
40. According to Erol Katircioglu, an economist who aligned himself with the SDPP
politically back in the 1990s, the problem was that the previous Motherland Party
government used the relatively high state involvment in the economy as a way to create
wealth for a small number of companies. The so called "State Owned Enterprises" which
were politically controlled, and were geared to produce intermediate goods, would keep
their prices artifically low so that companies using the equipment sold by these
enterprises would make healthy profits. What, indeed, was meant by economic
democratization was an intervention to break this vicious (for people, yet virtuous for
those companies) cycle and bring down prices for the common men. See Interview with
Erol Katircioklu, Economist, Bilgi University, in Istanbul, Turk. (Mar. 20, 2006).
41. This idiom, "crushing the middle class," was indeed used very frequently by the
SDPP in its election platform, both in 1989 municipal elections and 1991 general elections
for the parliament.
175
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 21:1
Medium Sized Enterprises" was held. One of the organizers of the
conference was the Turkish Foundation for Small and Medium
Enterprises (TFSME). TFSME itself was, at the time, a young
organization founded in 1989 to represent self-employed people as well
as small and medium sized enterprises. 42
Similarly, on December 16-17, 1995, the Turkish Artisans and
Retailers and Small Sized Industries Research Institute organized
another conference entitled "The Impact of the Law on the Protection of
Competition on the Small and Medium Sized Enterprises."43 Nurkut
Inan, the chair of the expert panel that had prepared the draft
competition law bill, organized this conference. In fact, this research
institute, and the larger organization it was part of-the Turkish
Artisans and Retailers Confederation (TARC)-had close relations with
the Ministry of Trade and Industry when the Ministry was controlled by
the SDPP. Such a close relationship between the Confederation and
Social Democrats continued in the years to come. Tahir Kbse, who
initiated efforts to pass a competition law as the Minister of Trade and
Industry in 1992, was the chief advisor to the chairman of TARC when I
interviewed him in 2006.44 Similarly, Ersen Yavuz, who was the
undersecretary of Tahir K6se, was a high level advisor at the TARC.45
Such organic links between the umbrella organization for the small
and medium-sized enterprises and the general activity around them in
relation to competition law suggest that the SDPP was trying to win
over a constituency and wanted to use the law as a way to bolster or
enhance its legitimacy among this group of business owners. After all,
election day was only a year away when the law was passed. The
competition law was passed on December 7, 1994, and general elections
were held on December 24, 1995.
42. The proceedings from the symposium was later published by the Turkish branch of
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany. See KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG,
TORKiYE'DE REKABETIN KORUNMASI VE KcOGK VE ORTA OLCEKLi ISLETMELER [THE
PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AND SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES IN TURKEY] 1
(1992).
43. REKABETIN KORUNMASI HAKKINDA KANUN'UN KQCuK VE ORTA OLCEKLI
ISLETMELERE ETKiSi [THE IMPACT OF THE LAW ON THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION ON
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES] (Nurkut Inan ed., 1996) (Turk.) (providing the
proceedings of this conference).
44. See Interview with Tahir Kose, Minister of Trade and Indus., Turk., in Ankara,
Turk. (July 17, 2006).
45. See generally REKABETIN KORUNMASI HAKKINDA KANUN'UN KQUK VE ORTA
OLCEKLI ISLETMELERE ETKisi, supra note 43 (providing the proceedings of this
conference). Also in 1997, Small and Medium Sized Industrialists and Exporters
Association published a book entitled The Constitution of The Free Market Economy: The
Law on the Protection of Competition. This is yet another sign that the competition agency
initially was thought to benefit these small and medium sized businesses.
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What is worth noting here is that this is a type of politics, a political
imaginary, that is squarely at odds with the type of expert politics that
is exemplified and demonstrated in the discourses of the Competition
Agency career personnel writings. This point will become clearer below,
but a hint here: the type of imagination in the activity of the SDPP is
such that political parties bid for the support of organized groups in the
society in an informal and implicitly corporatist system, as was the case
with organized labor, artisans, small producers, and others. Benefits are
accorded to these groups according to the deals they strike with party
organizations. The "new" neoliberal politics that is to be crystallized
later in the body of the competition agency flatly refuses such type of
politics. Not only do competition professionals view such corporatist
shadows in politics to be generating inefficiency, but also in their
discourse an atomized consumer figure replaces citizens and any of their
political associations. The economic space is to be cleared from any
influence from such political associations.
Apart from this shifting politics, the second change that took place
with regard to competition law practice concerns the inspiration and
origins of the competition law. Such inspiration came essentially from
Europe as the law was drafted and in its initial years. Just to give a
brief sketch of such inspiration, it can be pointed out that the conference
that I alluded to above-"The Protection of Competition and Small and
Medium Sized Enterprises in Turkey"-was organized in part by the
Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a German think tank who has offices in
Turkey, two years before the passage of the law. As part of the German
involvement, the chairman of the German Cartel Office at the time,
Dieter Wolf, was present in the conference, and he gave a speech
entitled, Social Market Economy and Competition.46 After this
particular conference, several such visits from Germany and Europe
took place.
This one instance was no isolated incident; the beginnings of the
Turkish competition policy had European (specifically German)
influences. Indeed, when a competition law was discussed in the late
1980s, its name was "anti cartel law,"47 a direct copy from Germany, and
46. Dieter Wolf, Chairman of the German Fed. Cartel Office, Soc. Mkt. Econ. and
Competition, Address at The Protection of Competition in Turkey and Small and Medium
Sized Enterprises Symposium 73-88 (Dec. 16, 1992). For the initial European influence,
see also Symposium, Avrupa Topluluu Rekabet Politikalanr, Hukuk Duzeni ve Thrk
Rekabet Kanun Tasarisi [European Community Competition Policy, Legal Order, and the
Turkish Competition Law Bill] (1993) (Turk.).
47. See Anti-Kartel Yasasi TBMM'ye Geliyor [Anti-Cartel Law Comes to the Turkish
Grand National Assembly], MILLIYET DAILY, December 18, 1989, at 5.
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the agency was to be named Cartel Office.48 Despite the change in the
name, the European influence was solid. Ersan G6kmen, a former
Competition Board Member, who had taken part in the institutional
formation of the Turkish Competition Authority, states that "they have
gone around in Europe in the process of looking what types of laws are
out there, and what institutional structures are there to back them
up."49 "Social market economy," borrowed from the Germans, is a term
frequently evoked by drafters of the law as a justification for
competition law in conferences, and references to competition law as
essentially a consumer friendly, social legislation abound.
Fast forward to 1997. The TCA has finally started practicing its
craft. It essentially started doing two things. First, the Agency would
pursue, investigate, and ultimately penalize competition violations and
oversee mergers and acquisitions. Second, the Agency began to "produce
knowledge" that, at its core, contains competition law and economics.
With regard to the former, the opinions of the Competition Board, the
executive and decision-making organ of the TCA, do not reveal a clear
trajectory or jurisprudence. Looking at the past fifteen years of
competition cases does not highlight an agenda that reveals a
jurisprudential or strategic trajectory. In fact, Nurkut Inan, the chair of
the expert panel who drafted the law back in 1994, made this point as a
complaint. Without endorsing or hinting at a particular political
trajectory, Inan argued, in an interview I conducted with him, that the
Agency has no real "agenda." He said that it is rather swayed, or set
into motion, by "complaints" most of the time. According to him, this
suggested that the Agency does not have a clear direction, preference as
to how to apply the law, or whether to follow a broad political trajectory
or not.50 A recent interview I conducted with a competition professional,
Ahmet Sazak, confirms this insight. According to him, there is no clear
agenda of the Agency and its decisions, but it clearly does follow signals
from the government as to what to do and who to target.5'
. The second major work of the Agency, producing knowledge through
producing reports, expertise theses, or briefs, offers a different story. It
is here that we see a major gap between the initial political goals
48. See ERGUN OZSUNAY, KARTEL HuKUKu [CARTEL LAw] 338-39, (1985) (Turk.)
(discussing the potential name from an earlier bill that was drafted in 1984 by the
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, but later died there). This bill speaks of a cartel
board ("Kartel Kurulu" in Turkish) as the executive organ of a proposed cartel office.
49. Interview with Ersan G6kmen, Turkish Competition Auth., in Ankara, Turk. (Apr.
14, 2006).
50. Interview with Nurkut Inan, Turkish Competition Auth., in Ankara, Turk. (July
11, 2006).
51. Interview with Ahmet Sazak (pseudonym), Competition Professional, in Istanbul,
Turk. (Dec. 7, 2012).
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associated with the Competition Authority and the practice of the
Agency itself. The career personnel, mostly economists, and to some
extent lawyers, prepare such reports and theses. An analysis of these
documents shows surprisingly little emphasis, if any, on the question of
consumers and small and medium sized enterprises.
Take, for instance, the case of expertise theses. 52 My analysis of
these theses between the years of 1997 and 2008 reveal that only one
out of eighty-four theses in total talk substantively about small and
medium enterprises. The only thesis to focus exclusively on small and
medium size enterprises is entitled, Small and Medium Sized
Enterprises and Competition Policy: The Place, Function and
Application of the De Minimis Rule in the Competition Law.53 It is far
from discussing the Turkish case in detail however, thus constituting no
exception to the absence of works focusing on the small and medium
sized industry in Turkey. It is about a specific rule, the de minimis
rule,54 and its application in competition law. The thesis explains how
the rule is applied in the European Union countries, and at the very
end, it has a relatively short section on Turkey (eleven pages out of
eighty). In this section, the author explains how from 1997 onward, the
Competition Authority dealt with small and medium-sized enterprises
52. Career personnel start their employment in the competition agency with the title of
"assistant competition expert." For three years, they work under this title and by the end
of their third year, they are expected to promote to the "competition expert" level, provided
their performance reviews are satisfactory. One also has to write an "expertise thesis" as a
precondition for promotion. An expertise thesis is a piece of written work that focuses on
an important issue in competition law and/or economics. Format-wise, expertise theses
can be likened to Master's theses: They are longer than an article/or a publishable paper
yet shorter than a full book or doctoral dissertation. They range between 60 pages to 140
pages, with an average of 83 pages (for the time period I analyzed). Content wise these
theses could be located within disciplines of economics-industrial economics in
particular-law, management or a combination of these different disciplines. See Turkish
Competition Authority, REKABET.Gov, http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/default.aspx?nsw-40fjF
KjHglhXmThhwumRUg=--H7deC+LxBI8=&nm=102 (last accessed Feb. 5, 2014) (Turk.)
(providing full texts of these expert theses); see also Turkish Competition Authority,
REKABET.GOv, http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/default.aspx?nsw=SiqkAswzJcW4RweYAjelRQ=
=-SgKWD+pQItw-&nm=307 (last accessed Feb. 5, 2014) (providing English titles of these
theses).
53. KEREM TOMUR, KOBILER VE REKABET PoLITIKASI: DEMINIMiS KURALININ REKABET
HUKUKUNDAKi YERi, I$LEVi VE UYGULAMA PRENSiPLERI [SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED
ENTERPRISES AND COMPETITION POLICY: THE PLACE, FUNCTION AND APPLICATION OF THE
DE MINIMIs RULE IN THE COMPETITION LAW] (2004) (Turk.), available at http://www.
rekabet.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT/Documents/UzmanlC4%Blk+Teziltez55.pdf.
54. This rule exempts relatively small firms from following specific competition laws,
merger guidlines, etc. If the net effect of an otherwise non competitive (and illegal) action
by firms (such as merger) will be smaller than a designated percentage (usually ten
percent) of the overall market share in these firms' sector of activity, then the competition
authorities ignore the violation.
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through its decisions.55 The thesis ends with proposals to make more
efficient and effective use of the de minimis rule in the Turkish context.
It is noteworthy that even a brief history of small and medium sized
enterprises in Turkey is missing from the thesis. There is no discussion
of what kind of an economic environment produced these enterprises or
how they are situated vis-a-vis the larger corporations. Instead, the
competition law of Turkey and the way the de minimis rule could be
accommodated within this body of law is discussed as a technical
matter. As part of this discussion, opinions of the Turkish Competition
Board regarding small and medium sized enterprises are introduced.
Certainly, the de minimis rule itself can be considered to be friendly
to, or beneficial for, small and medium-sized enterprises. After all, the
rule suggests that competition agencies should ignore competition
violations such as collusions or agreements between firms, if such
violations take place between relatively small or medium sized players
in a market. The tone of the writing, however, suggests that the reason
for this rule is not necessarily the protection of the small against the
big. On the contrary, the thesis frames the question as one of economic
efficiency. The author suggests that "the significance and function of
competition for the efficient use of resources and economic productivity
is widely accepted."56 "Increase[s] in the efficiency and productivity of
small and medium sized enterprises through collusions or partnerships
with each other" are of interest because such increases are "crucial for
the broader economy and competition policies at large."57
The protection of consumers is a theme that is frequently talked
about in the expertise theses. The fashion in which it is talked about,
however, is worlds apart from the way the notion is used by the drafters
of the law. Just like small and medium-sized enterprises do not
constitute a significant topic for these theses, no explicit discussion of
economic democratization could be found in them. In other words, the
second major political rationale that was put forward by those who
initiated the bill, economic democratization, is also absent from these
theses.
What is more interesting, nonetheless, is the way potential social
effects of competition policy are framed and presented in these
documents. Even though it may be unrealistic to expect to see a
politically loaded term such as "economic democratization" in these
expert theses, these theses should present a rationale and justification
as to how competition laws and policies would lead to socially beneficial
outcomes. The way the potential benefits of the competition laws are
55. TOMUR, supra note 53, at 60-71.
56. TOMUR, supra note 53, at 24.
57. Id. at 23.
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presented reveals an overly technical view of the society that imagines
and advances another form of politics. Economic democratization for
citizens is operationalized by replacing the "citizen" with the "consumer"
in these texts. The emphasis on the beneficial effects of competition
policy on certain social groups is replaced with a monolithic
understanding of a "society of consumers." The general pattern is that
the society is imagined as a unitary entity, which can gain, as a whole,
from the implementation of competition laws. Notions such as "general
welfare" or "total social welfare" are frequently used.
Hiiseyin Unlil, for instance, argues that "the protection of the
competitive process [would ensure] the distribution of resources
according to the demands of the society [and thus would contribute to]
the general/total welfare."58 He goes on to suggest, quoting the Preamble
for the Law on the Protection of Competition, that the decrease in prices
due to increased competition "would increase the welfare of consumers,
thus the society as a whole."59
Equating consumers with the society as a whole is a conceptual tool,
which can be found in almost all of the theses. Tarkan Erdokan
discusses the efficiency implications of large retailers versus small
shops in his 2003 thesis on the purchasing power in the retail sector.60
Throughout the thesis, Erdokan approaches the question from the
perspective of "consumer welfare." His usage suggests that consumer
welfare is equated with overall societal welfare. What is further worth
noting is that Erdokan's argument that bigger retail centers are much
better from an efficiency point of view goes completely against the
initial idea that competition law could be a means to protect small and
medium sized businesses.61
Instead, the objective of competition laws is narrowed down to the
securing of efficiency. There are various other theses that explicitly spell
out the goal or function of competition laws. Murat Qetinkaya, for
instance, argues that "competition policy [aims] to secure economic
efficiency."62 Mehmet Yanik agrees:
58. HOSEYiN UNLO, REKABET HUKuU SORUSTURMALARINDA TARAF KAVRAMI VE
TARAFLARIN HAKLARI [THE CONCEPT OF PARTIES IN COMPETiTION INVESTIGATIONS AND
THEIR RIGHTS] 12-13 (2003) (Turk.).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. TARKAN ERDOdAN, REKABET HUKUKU AGIsINDAN PERAKENDE SEKTORT3NDE ALIM
GuCO [PURCHASING POWER IN THE RETAIL SECTOR FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
COMPETITION LAw] 1 (2003) (Turk.).
61. Id.
62. MURAT QETINKAYA, ILGILi PAZAR KAVRAMI VE ILGiLi PAZAR TANIMINDA
KULLANILAN NiCEL TEKNiKLER [THE CONCEPT OF RELEVANT MARKET AND THE
QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES USED IN THE DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET] 10
(2003) (Turk.).
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One of the most significant features of a fully
competitive market is the freedom of firms to enter and
exit the market. It is due to this feature that the
resources are allocated and utilized efficiently. The
principal goal of competition laws is to provide robust
environments in which free and competitive markets
could thrive.63
Ali Demiroz is more explicit and thorough in his definition:
Competition policies aim to [secure] allocative efficiency,
production with the least possible costs. . . . [They also]
help build a competitive environment which would
eventually led to an increase in societal welfare. To this
end, competition laws prohibit agreements or mergers
between corporations which would limit competition or
abusing dominant position in a market.6 4
All in all, these theses suggest that the earlier political emphasis
was silenced, and an overly technical understanding of the society has
become dominant. It would certainly be wrong to call this new direction
that the Agency has taken as "apolitical." It, indeed, is a type of politics
that tries to render itself invisible. Just like the Latourian black box
that aims to make sure that the politics and all the sustenance work
that goes into making a particular paradigm seem smoothly functioning,
this new type of expert politics similarly tries to make itself seem
apolitical while at the same time being right in the heart of politics.
III. THE UNITED STATES BECOMES THE INTELLECTUAL INSPIRATION
Similarly, a brief look at the expertise theses suggests that the
intellectual inspiration for the knowledge producing function of the
competition authority is tilted toward the United States. While the
impact of Europe is still very much visible, particularly in the case of
legal cases that are cited, the "theory" dimension takes its inspiration
very much from the United States.
63. MEHMET YANIK, REKABET HUKUKUNUN HAKiM DURUM VE HAKiM DURUMUN
KOTUYE KULLANILMASI UYGULAMALARINDA PiYASA GiRi$ ENGELLERi [BARRIERS TO ENTRY
UNDER THE DOMINANT POSITION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION PRACTICES OF
COMPETITION LAW] 7 (2003) (Turk.).
64. ALi DEMIROZ, YENi EKONOMiDE REKABET KURALLARI [COMPETITION RULES IN THE
NEW EcONOMY] 7 (2002) (Turk.).
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To give an example, the two most cited books (except for
authoritative Turkish sources such as legal textbooks on competition
law) in the eighty-four theses that I analyzed are Herbert Hovenkamp's
Federal Antitrust Policy and Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox.65
Hovenkamp's Federal Antitrust Policy is cited by nineteen theses out of
the eighty-four. This means that more than 22 percent of the experts in
the Agency have been exposed to Hovenkamp's view. Hovenkamp's
work, which focuses on the United States and antitrust theory in
general, is considered foundational for the post-Chicago approach to
antitrust policy. Hovenkamp and E. Thomas Sullivan's Antitrust Law,
Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems is similarly used by
ten theses.66 Needless to point out, even though Hovenkamp is a post-
Chicago School academic, his views on efficiency and the primary
nature of economic analysis are not much different than the views of the
Chicago School of Antitrust.
Perhaps more telling is that Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox, which
is one of the essential books of the law and economics paradigm, is cited
by thirteen out of eighty-four theses or 15 percent. In other words,
thirteen out of eighty-four people who have written a thesis had
presumably read Bork's book. This book is the defining book for the
Chicago School paradigm in antitrust/competition, which stood for an
almost complete belief in the invisible hand of the market as a regulator
of the economy and a high level of suspicion toward state intervention in
the economic sphere. In the book, Bork argues that increasing societal
welfare, measured with sophisticated and abstract economic methods,
should guide competition policy rather than political goals such as
protecting small firms or preventing economic power to turn into
political power. This is something that again shows how different the
intellectual background of these theses is compared to the initial
motivation behind the materialization of competition authority in
Turkey, that of creating a social market economy.
As important, if not more so, as the books are the cases from the
United States and the European Union jurisdictions. A brief look at the
bibliographies of the theses suggests that competition cases from
Europe constitute the major chunk of the writing in these theses.67
65. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE (1994); ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1978).
66. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1989).
67. By cases, I mean legal cases. For the European Union these cases include
competition violation cases filed with the competition agencies in the EU countries,
appellate court cases in these countries regarding a decision of any competition agency.
More frequently however, decisions handed down by the European Commission's
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Looking at the combined case bibliographies of eighty-four expertise
theses, I found that cases from Europe are cited a total of 1,260 times.68
This makes on average fifteen cases per thesis. There are a total of 362
references to the cases from the United States. The discrepancy between
the two figures shows that the European Union laws and cases are far
more important for Turkey given that Turkey has a Customs Union
agreement with the European Union and that it is still trying to
harmonize its laws with the Union as it has a membership prospect in
the future. The theses cite Turkish cases 225 times.
Authors likely cite a lower number of cases from Turkey because the
application of competition law in Turkey is rather recent. Over the
years, we can expect a rise in the number of citations from Turkey,69
but, as of now, the theses have a large chunk of case discussions from
the European Union and to some extent the United States. The cases,
particularly from the United States and the EU countries, are not only
cited, but also discussed at length as authoritative statements
explaining how to apply the law on competition and how to form
competition policies. While this does not mean that decisions are viewed
without any criticism, ultimately the principles of competition law come
from legal decisions in Europe and the United States as much as they
come from theory.
Directorate on Competition (the Commission) and decisions by the European Court of
Justice (as the appellate body for the Commission) are cited. For the United States, the
decisions include Federal Trade Commission decisions, as well as appellate decisions by
courts of appeals, or by the Supreme Court. For Turkey, these cases include Competition
Board decisions regarding a violation or decisions by the Administrative Court of Appeals
regarding an appeal of a Competition Board decision.
68. There, of course, are repetitions in this figure (i.e., some cases are cited multiple
times in this list of 1,260 citations). What I did with the cases cited is that I basically
group them all together and counted the total number. If a case is cited in more than one
thesis that means it appears more than once in this total figure. Unfortunately, because
the citation formats for the cases are not yet standardized, I could not see which cases are
cited the most. Another point to mention here is that these figures (case citations) include
all the cases from all the levels in Europe, the United States, or Turkey, as suggested in
the previous footnote.
69. Indeed, if we look at the number of citations over the years between 1997 and 2008,
we see an increase in the case citations from Turkey. There has been five cohorts of
expertise thesis writing in this period and with the exception of the last (5th) cohort, the
citations from Turkish legal system increased regularly. There are nineteen theses in the
first cohort and thirteen citations to cases in Turkey, 0.68 cases per thesis. This number
increases to seventy-nine cases in the second cohort, which means 2.82 cases per thesis.
The per thesis case citation is 3.70 and 5.75 for the third and fourth cohorts respectively.
In the fifth cohort, oddly enough, this number declines back to two cases per thesis. In any
case, to be meaningful, a larger set of theses and cohorts are needed before making
inferences about the time component.
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These figures on the book citations and case citations suggest that,
while case law from Europe is still very much significant, the
intellectual inspiration of the law has shifted toward the United States.
Perhaps even more importantly, we can view these expertise theses and
cited cases as actual translations in which the new actors of competition
law translate the network for themselves. By selectively incorporating
the history and experiences of the United States and Europe and by
bringing in the knowledge produced in these locales, these new actors
define their work and distinguish it from the previous generation of
bureaucrats and politicians; they thus bring to life the competition
network that would benefit them the most. Similarly, it is possible to
see that these career personnel translate and "produce" Turkey in their
expertise theses in a very specific manner: using the tools and lenses of
the economics discipline, they turn Turkey into an object, a case study.
In this translation, history is erased and Turkey is produced as a site
commensurable to other similar country contexts. This translation is
what makes the work of these experts so significant and renders such
work and its baggage an alternative to the previous generation's
renderings of Turkey.
IV. THE PROCESS OF TRANSLATION
How can we make sense of this shift? If there is a change from a
politically motivated starting point of competition laws found in
European beginnings toward a more sterile economic competition law
with U.S. influences and inspiration, what explains this change?
Certainly, it can be argued that the change is due to the research
methodology I employ in this article. First, to make the case for the
shift, I have looked to documents originating from politicians and law
drafters. Second, I have analyzed the career bureaucrats' reports and
theses. Given that these two groups are, by definition, different in terms
of their interests and objectives, it is not difficult to see that it can be
argued why there appears to be a shift. One can say, after all, that it is
only normal that politicians would emphasize political goals that they
think would bring them more votes and power. Career personnel, on the
other hand, are more inclined toward professionalism and expertise,
which is their strong suit. And this, arguably, can explain the observed
shift.
While this is partly true, the broader story is obviously more
complicated, and it has to do with a variety of factors. The passage of
the law in Turkey has to be analyzed as part of the opening of the black
box of national developmentalism, both as an economic policy paradigm
and as an overall developmental discourse. Indeed, the shift offers a
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microcosm of such opening in a short period of time. As Latour's
theoretical framework demonstrates, a scientific or policy paradigm can
be successful if it can open the black box of rival paradigms and show
the actual political work that goes into sustaining those paradigms.
Simultaneously rendering itself and the power relations it is implicated
in as invisible and apolitical, a new paradigm can become dominant if it
shows itself to be a harmonious, unbreakable unity that takes its power
not from the amount of work that keeps it going, but from its internal
correctness. In this sense, national developmentalism, particularly in
the post-1980 period, was a black box that was in the process of being
opened and torn apart. Not only were the interest groups that seemed to
benefit from this policy paradigm exposed, but the very politics of
distribution that this paradigm entailed were labeled by the alternative
neoliberal paradigm as inefficient, corrupt, and out of touch with the
modern world.
What is interesting in the Turkish case is that the drafters of the
Turkish competition law aimed to utilize a new institutional form for
their traditional goals, which were formulated from within the national
developmentalist discourse. The form or the institution they chose,
however, quickly became an actor network and part of a global network
that produces a new type of politics. This new body of laws and the
institution to oversee them, in other words, were drawn to the orbit of
mainstream neoliberal hegemony in the process. This mainstream
emphasized, more than anything, the hegemony of a certain type of
economics as a science of governance that is very much centered in the
United States.
The general framework in which this shift took place has its roots in
the growing influence of the United States in the Turkish field of power
in the Post-World War II period. The early Turkish Republic (1923-45)
was much more involved with Europe, both in terms of politics and in
terms of setting Europe (a civilization) as a model to follow. The United
States' influence on the Turkish field of power has been a Post-World
War II phenomenon. The United States financially helped the Turkish
State via Marshall Plan as part of its policy of containing the Soviet
Union and protecting the nations from an alleged communist threat.
Since then, Turkey has remained in the orbit of the United States
hegemony, even though there have been occasional conflicts and points
of crises, such as the invasion of northern Cyprus by the Turkish army
in 1974 that led to a U.S. embargo of arms to Turkey. 70
However, such economic and geopolitical partnership has not
resulted in a direct influence on the mechanisms of statehood in Turkey.
70. See ZURCHER, supra note 35, at 287.
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While engineers employed by the Turkish State were sent to the United
.States for postgraduate education and training programs as early as the
1950s,71 regular links between the two countries in the field of education
and training of state personnel started as late as the end of the 1960s.
Perhaps even more importantly, the fields of law and finance have
remained very much immune from U.S. influence; they remain
essentially focused on Europe. Partly because the Turkish State, in its
earlier years, (between the two World Wars) modeled its laws on
European examples and partly because Turkish legal education was
designed with German and French models in mind, legal education has
remained focused on Europe until very recently (i.e., the post-2000s).
The Turkish model of economic governance was similar to those of
European countries in terms of its aspiration to bring about high
employment rates through state mediation of labor and capital. A
welfare state model, with its own peculiarities of course, was adopted
under an import substitution industrialization regime. Combined with
the earlier, interwar Republican goal of modernizing the nation and the
country, this policy bundle constituted national developmentalism, the
policy paradigm for overall economic growth and national
modernization.
This model began to be criticized heavily beginning in the late
1970s, particularly after Turkey's severe economic crisis from 1978 to
1979. To begin with, the big businesses, which had their share of
benefits from the national developmentalist policy bundle, left this
coalition when they perceived their profit rates going down between
1970 and 1980 at the expense of increasing worker real wages.72 More
importantly for this article was the formation of a group of intellectual-
policy entrepreneurs, within and outside of the state, who aligned
themselves with and helped with the construction of a rival neoliberal
paradigm. These policy entrepreneurs were of high significance for the
opening up of the black box of national developmentalism and the
.securing of the neoliberal black box, so to speak, because they engaged
in extensive knowledge and information work.
71. One of the most notable examples is Suleyman Demirel, who was the prime
minister of Turkey several times over the course of 1960s and 70s, and who later served as
the president of Turkish Republic between 1993 and 2000. Early in his career in the
Turkish State's Directory of Water Works, he joined training programs in the United
States in the early 1950s.
72. See ERiNC YELDAN, KCRESELLESME SURECINDE TORKIYE EKONOMISi [TuRKISH
ECONOMY IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION] 69 (11th ed. 2005) (Turk.); see generally
BORATAV, supra note 39 (providing a broader overview of the Turkish macroeconomic
history); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005) (providing a similar
argument for the United States and Britain).
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These groups of policy entrepreneurs, formed as the connection to
the United States, particularly through educational links and
intergovernmental agreements, started to mature and bear fruit.
Turgut Ozal, the author of the January 24, 1980, decisions,73 which are
considered one of the most important steps in the liberalization of the
Turkish economy, was a bureaucrat trained in the United States. Later,
he assumed the key vice premiership role and acquired responsibility
for the economy between 1980 and 1983. He then founded the
Motherland Party (MP), referred to above, which ruled the country
between 1983 and 1989. Lastly, he became the president and stayed in
that position until his death in 1993.
Even more importantly, the Turkish State, which has long sent its
bureaucrats to foreign countries for training and education purposes,
shifted its preference from European countries to the United States.
While legal officials have remained an exception to this tradition, any
governmental agency that has to do with the management of the
economy, trade, or finance, began to send its career personnel to the
United States in overwhelming numbers. Data on this point is
unfortunately not abundant. But based on my research in the Turkish
Prime Ministry archives, I can point to a recent set of figures. For
instance, the Ministry of Finance sent 166 of its career bureaucrats
abroad for one or two-year Master's programs between the years 1995
and 2005. Out of the 166 personnel sent, nine went to England, two
went to Belgium, and the remaining 155 went to the United States. 74
Similarly, the Undersecretariat of Treasury sent 222 of its career
personnel abroad mainly for one or two-year Master's or training
programs between 1995 and 2007. Out of the 222 personnel sent,
twenty-seven went to England, four went to Japan, three to France, one
to India, one to Italy, and one to Belgium. The remaining 185 went to
the United States.75 As yet another example, the Undersecretariat of
Foreign Trade sent 124 of its career personnel abroad to get a one or
two-year Master's degree or training. Out of the 124 personnel sent,
twelve went to England, three to Russia, two went to Canada, one to
Germany, one to Belgium, and one to Spain. The remaining 104 went to
the United States.
More examples can be given, but the short story is that U.S.
influence has increased within the Turkish State, starting from the late
1960s, and became almost totally dominant in the post-1980 period.
This has particularly been the case in the bureaucratic departments
that focus on economics, economic management, and finance.
73. See YELDAN, supra note 72; BORATAV, supra note 39.
74. Source material collected from Prime Ministry archives (on file with the author).
75. Id.
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This turn to the United States in obtaining expertise for the Turkish
State has been accompanied by an arguably deeper, yet equally
influential shift. While certain key pockets of university and college
educations in Turkey, such as finance and law, remained European
oriented until very recently, business education, or enterprise
economics, transitioned to the U.S. style starting from the mid-1950s.
Heavy U.S. investment in programs that would foster U.S.-style
programs for business economics in Turkey replaced the German
influence that was dominant in the interwar period. "The US itself was
actively involved in the transfer process through its government
agencies for international aid, private foundations, and universities."76
These earlier networks of U.S.-style business education have not
initially constituted routes to state power. This is because such
education was designed for the market in the first place. The relatively
heavy influence of development economics as a discipline on statecraft
and planning during the Post-World War II years was also crucial for
why U.S. style education could not be of central importance. Lastly,
because European-oriented disciplines such as law still constituted the
essential routes to state power, business education has not been part of
the strategy for those who would like to assume state power.
Approximately sixty years later, however, a brief look at the
composition of the Turkish Competition Authority's expert staff reveals
that these earlier networks have matured to bear fruit and become
routes to state power. If we look at the schools and majors from which
career bureaucrats in the Competition Authority have graduated, we
can see that an overwhelming majority of them are from either business
administration or economics departments. As of January 2013, there are
a total of 132 career personnel in the Competition Agency of Turkey. Of
these 132, forty are from business administration departments and
thirty-four are from economics departments. Law graduates, by
contrast, make up a total of twenty-four of the 132.77
So while the politicians tried to mobilize a new institutional form for
their traditional style of politics, once this new form began recruiting its
staff, it is filled with actors who were already within the network of the
76. Behlil Usdiken, The French, the German and the American: Higher Education for
Business in Turkey, 1883-2003, 31 NEW PERSP. ON TURKEY 5, 15 (2004); see also BehIl
Usdiken, Tiirkiye'de ly Yapmanm ve Igletmenin Akademikleptirilmesi [The Academicization
of Doing Business and Management in Turkey], 1930-1950, 58 ANKARA UNIVERSITESi
SiYASAL BILIMLER FAKI)LTESi DERGiSi [ANKARA UNIV. FAc. OF POL. SCI. J.] 120 (2003)
(Turk.).
77. See Competition Authority, REKABET.GOV, http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/File/9path=R
OOT%2fDocuments%2fPersonel%2b%25c4%25b0statistik%2fmeslek2Ol3.pdf (last accessed
Feb. 7, 2014) (providing the educational statistics of the Competition Authority's career
personnel).
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new type of politics. Not only were they graduates of recently remodeled
universities and departments, but they were also determined to extend
and strengthen their networks. In this sense, once the Competition
Agency started its craft, the neoliberal commonsense, which had been in
the process of being constructed for sometime by then found a new
institutional hub for itself. This also made possible the extension of the
network by way of producing knowledge and publications and thus
increased the solidity of the network while trying to actively recruit
more allies.
At this point, the question can be raised as to why we see the shift
in the exact five-year period between the initiation of the law in 1992
and the starting of the practice of competition with the establishment of
the Competition Authority in 1997. After all, the politicians who
initiated the law have also been part of Turkey, which has been exposed
to growing United States influence. The answer to this question has to
focus on "generational politics." The political agenda that defined the
initial years of the competition law has to do with the cadre or
generation of people who initially translated and imported these laws to
Turkey: they were politicians from the center left and junior partner of
the coalition government that passed the law. The center-left
politicians, who passed the law, acted with a goal to protect consumers
and small and medium sized industries, essentially as a policy or
election goal. Then there were the career bureaucrats whose
professional socialization, at least back then, attached a modernizing
angle to the importation of competition laws. Both of these groups have
long been the essential institutions of continuity in the Turkish
Republic. While the Social Democratic People's Party that passed the
law is a direct continuation of the Republican People's Party that
"founded the Republic," the bureaucracy has been closely aligned with
this party as it has served as the carrier of the ambitious modernization
reforms of the Turkish State.78
Both of these groups translated and articulated-or tried to do so-
the emerging competition network to their interests, aspirations, and
goals. The way they translated competition policy has echoed national
developmentalism and modernization, the policy paradigms that these
two groups have been strongly affiliated with. The bureaucrats and
politicians who initiated the translation and appropriation of
competition laws belonged to a generation that came of age during the
high times of import substitution industrialization and the related
growth and development of the Turkish economy between 1950 and
78. See generally FEROz AHMAD, THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY (1993) (providing a
brief history of Turkey, and its modernization process); ERIC J. ZORCHER, TURKEY: A
MODERN HISTORY (3d ed. 2004).
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1970. Turkey, accordingly,- was still to be constructed, developed, and
carried forward. Given that Europe was the end point of such
modernization discourse, and that these career bureaucrats saw
themselves as protectors and modernizers of the Turkish nation, they
took European laws as the model -for the Turkish code while also
praising and highlighting the social market economy among the
potential end goals of the competition law imports. Basing their strategy
on an implicitly corporatist framework of politics, they highlighted the
importance of competition law both as a mechanism to garner votes for
the politicians and also as a mechanism to help the overall middle class.
This initial moment of institutional translation was bound to change
however. The generation that staffed the Competition Authority's career
ranks after its establishment in 1997 was rather young and part of a
different world of meanings and practices. The founders of the
Competition Authority made a conscious choice to recruit from scratch
all the technical and career personnel in the Competition Authority,
rather than inviting state employees in different corners of state
bureaucracy such as the Ministry of Finance, the Central.Bank, and so
forth. This meant that the oldest person in this new generation must
have been born in the early 1970s, -which marked the beginning of the
end of the happy days of national developmentalism. This new
generation to staff the career ranks of the Competition Authority came
of age after the military intervention or coup d'etat of 1980 and its
heavy-handed policies of depoliticization and liberalization followed in
close alignment with the United States.7 9 The days of national
developmentalism were over by then, and the market logic began to
take over already. Having come of age in such circumstances, among
other things, this generation's approach to questions about Turkey,
development, and the market is rather different than the previous
generation.o
This generational dynamic, combined with the already existing
tendencies and increased network ties with the United States, ended up
shifting the Turkish competition policy from its earlier beginnings,
which emphasized European origins, and more traditional form of
politics. In other words, the already existing background of U.S.
influence and turn to economics and business administration broadly
made possible the cultivation of the Competition Agency as a neoliberal
institution with strong U.S. influences and sterile, neoliberal politics on
79. In this sense, Turkish neoliberalization is very similar to the Chilean process,
which also took place under a heavy-handed authoritarian military regime.
80. See generally QAdLAR KEYDER, ULUSAL KALKINMACILIGIN IFLASI [THE BANKRUPTCY
OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTALISM] (1993) (Turk.) (detailing the transformation of Turkey
from national developmentalism to neoliberalism).
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the one hand. On the other hand, this very dynamic made the
Competition Agency itself a hub for furthering the goals of this new
generation of "technopols." The new breed of career bureaucrats began
to cultivate the Competition Authority as a site through which the
neoliberal narrative on markets, economics, and law is produced and
communicated. They did this to open up a space for themselves in the
field of politics and the field of state power, which had long been
dominated by the more traditional bureaucratic and political elites.
From within the actor-network theory, it is indeed possible to read
this shift as a result of a struggle between an old guard and new
aspiring actors for state power. While that angle is certainly there, it is
also possible to view this transformation as part of the growing
mainstream or orthodoxy within the transnationalizing field of
competition law and economics and the recruiting of more allies for this
growing mainstream from Turkey. The policies that were put forward
by the politicians and bureaucrats who initiated the law started a
process through which more allies could be added to the competition
network. Once the process was set into motion, however, the shape of
the network shifted. The pull of the U.S. model in 1997 was much
stronger than in early 1990s, due to, among many other things, the end
of the Cold War. Combined with the increased influence of the United
States on state expertise in Turkey, this pull conditioned the new shape
of the network in this country: actors began to be much more disposed
toward this new way of thinking about competition law and economics
due to the obvious strength of the network.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the previous pages, I offered a "thick description" of a legal
reform in Turkey and showed the political, social, and generational
intricacies of what otherwise appears to be a legal transplantation that
has been replicated in so many different parts of the world.
What can be generalized from this thick description? The answer is
offered in the body of the text in bits and pieces, but I would like to offer
a very brief sketch of it below.
As the quote from Cronin above suggests,81 this case study shows
that globalization is by no means homogenization. Indeed, if anything,
through globalization, what we realize is how distant and different
countries and their institutional and social systems are. Whether such
recognition of distance and difference leads the way to bridges is a
question to answer over time. What we can say now is that a myriad of
81. See supra Part I. at 162.
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translations emerge as a way to render navigable and legible this mind-
bogglingly intricate terrain. Translation, thus, emerges as a mode of
thinking and action, and globalization itself indeed becomes translation.
Similarly, at an analytical level, translation emerges as an analytic
tool or heuristic to make sense of this extremely complicated landscape.
While there are several ways to use translation as an analytic-and the
papers in this special issue offer a wealth of such different approaches-
in this article, I used the concept employed mainly in the actor-network
theory. Accordingly, global legal reforms as such do not exist; instead
various groups of actors get together behind reforms both to construct
new paradigms, or reforms, as strong actor-networks, and to beat the
old, the traditional, the former. Similarly, legal transplants are by
definition meaningless if there are no groups to appropriate them and
become part of the network these transplants belong to. Certainly, such
knowledge and disposition to become part of these networks is
conditioned through broad socio-historical factors and larger dynamics
of political economy. Thus, a view of translation and appropriation in
the study of legal reform and its global proliferation needs to take into
account these broader factors as well.
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